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This study presents a two-good, two-country model with financial 
frictions, where banks facing a borrowing constraint intermediate 
funds between households and firms. The endogenous fluctuations 
of international relative prices increase the business cycle co-
movement across countries when combined with habit formation in 
consumption and investment adjustment costs. Financial frictions 
due to the borrowing constraint of the banks further amplify the 
effects of productivity and capital quality shocks within a country 
and across the two countries.
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I. Introduction
The financial crisis in 2007–2008 has renewed interests in the role 
that financial factors play in the business cycle. Particularly, the rapid 
propagation of disruptions in financial markets from the U.S. to outside 
the U.S. at the onset of the financial crisis brings our attention to the 
international transmission of shocks through financial linkages.
This study builds a two-good, two-country model in which financial 
intermediation facing a borrowing constraint has nontrivial implications 
on the business cycle domestically and internationally. In the model, 
financial intermediaries or banks intermediate funds between 
households and firms. However, banks face a borrowing constraint due 
to limited contract enforceability. I assume a simple agency problem 
following Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2011) to 
introduce an endogenous borrowing constraint for banks. Financial 
frictions due to borrowing constraint are shown to amplify the effect of 
a country-specific shock across countries and within the country where 
the shock originates. Endogenous fluctuations of the asset prices affect 
the balance sheet condition of banks and consequently their lending to 
firms. The cross-border effect of a shock is amplified because banks are 
directly exposed to foreign shocks through foreign asset holdings.
The model incorporates devices, such as habit formation in 
consumption and investment adjustment costs. The quantitative 
macroeconomic literature has found that such devices are useful in 
explaining the business cycle quantitatively. Particularly, the present 
study shows that when combined with habit formation in consumption 
and investment adjustment costs, the fluctuations of international 
relative prices propagate a country-specific shock internationally. 
Furthermore, these fluctuations make the business cycle co-move 
across countries. Frictions in financial intermediation amplify this 
propagation of a country-specific shock.
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) 
incorporated financial factors into the quantitative macroeconomic 
framework. Afterward, many attempts have been made that extend 
financial factors to an open economy and investigate their effects on 
the international transmission of shocks. Earlier papers that used 
a two-country framework include those of Gilchrist, Hairault, and 
Kempf (2003); Iacoviello and Minetti (2006); and Faia (2007). The recent 
financial crisis renewed interests in the effects of financial frictions on 
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the international business cycle. Devereux and Yetman (2010) and Yao 
(2019) studied the international transmission of shocks when investors 
face a leverage constraint in borrowing. Kollmann, Enders, and Muller 
(2011) assumed that global banks face a capital requirement and 
investigate how such a requirement affects the international business 
cycle. Kim (2011) studied international macroeconomic fluctuations 
in Korea by focusing on the fluctuation sources in key international 
macroeconomic variables.
My model contributes to this literature in several aspects. First, I 
allow for endogenous fluctuations of international relative prices, unlike 
Devereux and Yetman (2010) and Yao (2019). Each country produces 
differentiated intermediate goods, and the final good production in 
each country is biased toward local intermediate goods. Therefore, 
international relative prices fluctuate in response to shocks, which is 
an important channel for the international transmission of the shocks 
(Heathcote and Perri, 2002). The co-movement of business cycles 
across countries is not entirely attributed to financial frictions in my 
model. Second, I introduce endogenous capital accumulation and labor 
supply, which are important factors in propagating the business cycle, 
in contrast to Devereux and Yetman (2010) who fix capital and labor 
supply. Lastly, the explicit consideration of financial intermediation in 
the model following Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki 
(2010) provides a framework. The objective is to extend the model in the 
future and study the effects of unconventional policy measures against 
the disruptions in financial intermediation during a financial crisis.
This paper is organized as follows. The benchmark model is described 
in Section II, and its solution method is explained in Section III. Section 
IV presents the impulse response functions to shocks and the cross-
country correlations of macroeconomic variables and discuss the 
results. Section V concludes this study.
II. Benchmark Model
The world economy consists of two countries of the same size, Home 
and Foreign. The structure of each country is similar to Gertler and 
Kiyotaki (2010), and I extend their model to a two-country model by 
allowing international trade of goods and assets.
Each country has households, intermediate-good-producing 
firms (i-firms), final-good-producing firms (f-firms), a capital-good-
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producing firm (c-firm), and banks. i-Firms produce a country-specific, 
differentiated intermediate good, whereas f-firms use the local and 
foreign intermediate goods to produce final goods for consumption 
and investment. Intermediate goods are freely traded across countries, 
whereas final goods are not tradable. The c-firm builds new capital, 
which is in turn sold to local i-firms. Banks intermediate funds between 
households and i-firms, which need to borrow for the purchase of new 
capital. I use the final goods as a numeraire in each country.
I describe the agents and their economic choices in turn. I omit the 
description of a sector of the Foreign economy when it is clear that the 
Foreign sector is defined symmetrically to the corresponding sector of 
the Home economy. A superscript “* ” is used to distinguish a variable 
for Foreign from its corresponding variable for Home. Subscripts 1 
and 2 denote a variable initiated by agents in Home and Foreign, 
respectively. For example, *1,tY  denotes intermediate goods produced in 
Home and exported to Foreign, whereas S2,t denotes lending by Foreign 
banks to i-firms in Home.
A. Households
A representative household in both countries has a continuum of 
members of measure one. A fraction 1 − m of the members denotes 
workers who supply labor and earn labor income, and the rest of the 
household members are bankers who manage banks in the same 
country. This heterogeneous composition of households is a device 
to have nonzero borrowing and lending in equilibrium. I assume that 
perfect consumption insurance works between workers and bankers in 
a household.
A representative household of Home chooses consumption of final 
goods Ct, supplies labor Lt, and deposits to banks in Home to maximize 
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subject to the flow budget constraint
 1 1t t t t t t t tC w L T R D D− −= + Π − + −  (2)
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where Dt denotes a deposit to local (Home) banks; Wt real wage; Πt 
dividends from the ownership of banks and the c-firm in Home; and 
Tt a lump-sum tax net of transfers. The expression for Πt is given later 
after describing the problem of banks and the c-firm. The deposit 
is noncontingent and earns interests at the gross interest rate of Rt 
between period t and period t + 1. I assume that the households cannot 
lend to foreign banks. The households also own i-firms and f-firms 
of Home, but their profits are zero in equilibrium because they are 
perfectly competitive.
The period utility function in (1) features habit formation in 
consumption and nests a Greenwood–Hercowitz–Huffman (GHH 
1988)-type preference. When no habit formation (h = 0) exists, the 
GHH preference exhibits no wealth effects on labor supply.1 Although 
certain wealth effects operate on labor supply in the presence of habit 
formation, the effects are weaker than a standard preference.
The optimality conditions for the representative household are
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 , 1 1t t t tE R+Ξ =  (4)
where , 1 , 1 ,/t t C t C tU Uβ+ +Ξ =  is the stochastic discount factor.
1 The open economy literature, such as Mendoza (1991), Neumeyer and Perri 
(2005), Chang and Fernández (2013), and Yao (2019), has found that the GHH 
preference helps replicate certain open-economy business cycle facts. GHH 
preference is also used in the credit market imperfection literature, such as Miao 
and Wang (2010) and Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Queralto (2011).
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B. Nonfinancial Firms
a) i-Firms
Each country has a continuum of perfectly competitive i-firms of 
measure one that produce country-specific intermediate goods. i-Firms 
have common constant returns to scale technology, with capital and 
labor as inputs. I assume that capital and labor cannot move across 
countries. The aggregate production function for the Home intermediate 
good is given by
 1t t t tY A K L
α α−= , (5)
where At is a country-specific productivity shock, Kt denotes capital, 
and Lt is labor input.
Capital is owned by i-firms. The i-firms purchase new capital It from 
the c-firm of the same country, financing the purchase by issuing one-
period securities against payoffs on capital to local and foreign banks. 
Let St denote the total number of securities or outstanding securities. 
Then, the asset supply in period t is determined as
 ( )1t t tS I Kδ= + − ,
where δ is a capital depreciation rate. However, capital is subject to a 
shock to its quality at the beginning of the next period; thus, capital is 
accumulated as
 1 1t t tK Sψ+ += . (6)
The capital quality shock ψt is introduced as a reduced-form shock to 
trigger a sudden collapse of the asset price.2 I assume that ψt is a one-
time shock with no persistence.
The profit maximization conditions of i-firms are given by
 






2 Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler, Kiyotaki and Queralto (2011) 
introduced a shock to the capital quality and interpreted it as capturing a 
certain form of economic obsolescence.
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, (8)
where P1,t is the price of the Home intermediate good in units of the 
final goods of Home; and Zt is the payoff per unit of capital, which will 
be entirely paid out to those banks holding claims to the capital return.
b) f-Firms
For notational simplicity, I introduce perfectly competitive f-firms 
rather than assuming that consumption and investment are a function 
of country-specific goods. A representative f-firm in Home produces a 
final good using Home and Foreign intermediate goods as inputs. This 
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 (9)
where Y1,t and Y2,t are the Home and the Foreign intermediate goods, 
respectively. The steady-state fraction of the Home intermediate goods 
in the Home final good production is given by φ. When φ > 1/2, a home 
bias is observed in the final good production. Let P2,t denote the price of 
the Foreign intermediate goods in units of the Home final goods. Then, 
f-firms maximize a profit, as shown as follows:
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− − − 
+ − − − 
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and the factor demand for Y1,t and Y2,t is determined as
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 1, 1,t t tY P F
ηϕ −=  (10)
 ( )2, 2,1 ,t t tY P Fηϕ −= −  (11)
respectively.
c) c-Firm
The c-firm transforms final goods to capital subject to convex 
adjustment costs and sell new capital to i-firms. The new capital is sold 
only to local firms because capital is immobile across borders.3 The 
c-firm solves
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  Ξ − + Ψ        
∑
taking Qt, the market price of new capital, as given. The c-firm 
discounts the future profits using the stochastic discount factor of the 
households Ξt,t+j because the households in Home own the c-firm.
The i-firms purchase new capital by issuing securities; thus, Qt 
is equal to the asset price. The production of new capital incurs 
adjustment cost Ψ(It / It-1) ∙ It, where the function Ψ satisfies Ψ(1) = Ψ′(1) 
= 0 and Ψ″(It / It-1) > 0. The adjustment cost is introduced to generate 
a time-varying price of capital. I assume that the adjustment cost is a 
function of changes in investment following Christiano, Eichenbaum, 
and Evans (2005) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), who found that 
3 I assume that capital is not mobile across borders to focus on the role of 
financial intermediation subject to frictions in international transmissions of the 
shocks. Only local c-firms supply new capital to meet an investment surge after 
a positive productivity shock in an economy where capital is immobile across 
borders. Thus, the price of new capital will rise; thus, an investment surge will 
be contained. Moreover, an investment surge can be supported by imported 
and domestically produced capital in an economy where capital is freely mobile 
across borders. Next, investment increases more compared with an economy 
where capital imports are impossible. However, all else equal, investment will 
be depressed in the foreign country because of the rise of the price of new 
capital. Therefore, international co-movement in investment will deteriorate in 
an economy where capital is freely mobile across borders compared with an 
economy where capital cannot move across borders.
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this type of investment adjustment costs is useful in explaining the 
quantitative response of the economy to a shock. The optimality 
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Future investment and thus the future asset prices may affect current 
investment through the forward-looking term on the right-hand side.
C. Banks
A continuum of banks of measure m intermediates funds between 
households and i-firms. Banks take deposits from local households 
and lend to local and foreign firms that use the funds to finance their 
investment. I assume an agency problem arising due to the limited 
enforceability of a contract, as in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and 
Gertler and Karadi (2011). That is, the banker managing a bank may 
embezzle certain asset holdings. This agency problem will impose an 
endogenous constraint on the borrowing of the bank. On the contrary, 
no friction exists between banks and firms.4 I also assume that banks 
pay small second-order stochastic costs when they lend to foreign firms 
to match the degree of diversification in portfolio observed in the data.
The balance sheet of a bank in Home is given by
 1, 1, ,t t t t t t tQ s e Q s n d
∗ ∗+ = +  (13)
where *tQ  denotes the price of the Foreign asset in units of the Foreign 
final good; s1,t and ∗1,tS  denote lending to Home and Foreign i-firms, 
respectively; nt is the net worth; and dt denotes the deposit by Home 
households.5 The real exchange rate et is quoted as the price of the 
4 I assume no frictions between banks and firms to focus on the role of 
financial intermediation, as in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010). Devereux and Yetman 
(2010) and Yao (2019) also assumed no frictions when a production firm rents 
capital from investors.
5 I do not allow the banks in one country to invest in other financial 
assets, such as bonds of another country, to focus on the role of financial 
intermediation subject to frictions in international transmissions of the shocks. 
Generally, investment in foreign bonds will operate as a channel through which 
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Foreign final goods in terms of the Home final goods. Net worth at the 
beginning of period t after shocks are revealed is the gross payoff to 
lending made in the previous period net borrowing costs, as shown as 
follows:
( ) ( )* * * *1, 1 1, 1 1 1
* * *
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 + − = ,
respectively.
In every period, a fraction 1 − π of the bankers in each household is 
randomly selected, quits the banking business, and becomes workers. 
That is, the survival probability of bankers’ period by period is π, and 
the average survival time is 1 / (1 − π). This assumption of entry and exit 
of bankers prevents banks from accumulating wealth and becoming 
financially unconstrained. I assume that m(1 − π) workers become 
bankers every period, such that the proportion of the occupations stay 
constant over time.
The exiting bankers hand over their net worth to the households as 
dividends. Newly entering bankers receive a start-up fund from their 
households and take part in the deposit market. The new bankers have 
the same decision problem as the old bankers, except that they do not 
have deposits from the previous period on their balance sheet. The 
objective of a banker at the end of period t is to maximize the expected 
the banks can hedge against adverse effects of the foreign productivity shocks 
on their balance sheets. Hence, the amplification of the shock transmission by 
financial intermediation will be dampened.
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Ξ −∑  (15)
The banker uses Ξt,t+j to discount future dividends in period t + j 
because the bank is owned by a household in Home.
After a bank obtains funds from depositors and lends to firms, its 
banker may divert a fraction θ of the asset holdings to his household, 
where 0 < θ < 1. If the banker cheats, then the bank is forced to default, 
and the creditors of the bank recover whatever remains. Let Vt(st) 
denote the maximized value function of (15), given { }*1, 1,, ,t t t ts s d=s . 
The following incentive constraint is imposed on the banker’s problem 
to prevent the embezzlement:
 ( ) ( )1, 1, ,t t t t t t tV Q s e Q sθ ∗ ∗≥ +s  (16)
which implies that the continuation value of banking is greater than or 
equal to private gains from the diversion. I assume that no difference 
in private gains from the diversion and subsequent recovery of local 
and foreign assets exists. In summary, the problem of a banker is to 
maximize (15) subject to (13) and (16).
The value function of a banker can be written recursively as
 ( ) ( ) ( ), 1 1 11 max .t t t t t t tV E n Vπ π+ + +
 = Ξ − +  t+1 t+1s
s s  (17)
To solve the problem, I conjecture that the value function is linear in its 
arguments and verify it later. That is,
 ( ) , 1, 1, ,, ,t t s t t t d t ts tV s s dν ν ν∗
∗= + −s
where νs,t is the marginal value of the Home asset holdings, ,s tν ∗  the 
marginal value of the Foreign asset holdings, and νd,t the marginal cost 


















with respect to s1,t + 1 and

















with respect to 1, 1ts
∗
+ , where λt+1 is the Lagrange multiplier for the 
incentive constraint (16). Using the complementary slackness condition,
 ( ) ( )1, 1, 0,t t t t t t t tV Q s e Q sλ θ ∗ ∗ − + = s
the value function can be written as
 ( ) ( ), .1t t d t t tV nν λ= +s  (20)
Plugging (20) back into (17), then
 , 1 1 1,t t t t t tV E n+ + += Ξ Ω
where ( ) ( )1 , 1 11 1t d t tπ πν λ+ + +Ω = − + +  is the marginal value of net worth. 
Net worth evolves according to (14) by the method of undetermined 
coefficients. Thus, I obtain
 ( ), , 1 1 1 1 11 ,s t t t t t t t tE Z Qν ψ δ+ + + + += Ξ Ω  + −    (21)
 ( ), 1 1 1 1 1 1, 1 ,t t t t t t t ts t E Z Q eν ψ δ∗
∗ ∗ ∗
+ + + + + + = Ξ Ω + −   (22)
and
 , , 1 1 .d t t t t t tE Rν + += Ξ Ω  (23)
The first-order conditions (18) and (19) imply that
 
( ) * 1, 1 1 , 1 , 1 1 , 1 ,tt t t t k t t t t t t k t t t
t
eE R R E R R
e
µ++ + + + + +
 




where ( )1 1 1/ 1t t tµ θλ λ+ + += +  is the marginal excess value of assets over 
the marginal cost of deposits, and
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+ + + +
 
Ξ Ω − = 
 
 (24)
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Equation (24) implies an uncovered parity for the rates of return on 
capital between the Home and Foreign assets. The effective discount 
factor , 1 1t t t+ +Ξ Ω  is that of the households augmented by the marginal 
value of net worth representing the interest of the banker in the 
continuation of the banking business.
Following Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), I select the parameter values 
of the model, such that the incentive constraint (16) binds in the steady 
state. I also analyze the dynamics of the model in the neighborhood of 
the steady state. That is, I assume that the incentive constraint (16) 
always binds. Then, (16) may be written as
 1, 1, ,t t t t t t tQ s e Q s nφ
∗ ∗+ =  (25)
where ( ), 1 /t d t tφ ν λ θ= +  can be interpreted as the leverage ratio of the 
bank. The marginal value of net worth Ωt+1 can be rewritten as
 ( ) ( )1 , 1 1 11 ,t d t t tπ π ν µ φ+ + + +Ω = − + +
which implies that an additional unit of net worth has the same unit 
value when the banker quits with probability of 1 − π. However, such 
an additional unit saves the marginal cost of a unit of deposits νd,t+1 and 
earns an excess value μt+1, multiplied by the leverage ratio ϕt+1 when 
the banker survives with probability π.
Aggregation across banks is straightforward. The balance sheet of an 
individual bank (13) is aggregated as
 1, 1, ,t t t t t t tQ S e Q S N D
∗ ∗+ = +  (26)
where S1,t and ∗1,tS  denote the aggregate holdings of the Home and 
Foreign assets, respectively, by Home banks; Nt is the aggregate net 
worth of Home banks; and Dt is the aggregate deposits in Home. The 
aggregation of (25) results in the aggregate asset demand equation
 1, 1, ,t t t t t t tQ S e Q S Nφ
∗ ∗+ =  (27)
where ϕt is common across individual banks, and thus aggregation is 
possible. The aggregate net worth Nt at the beginning of each period, 
after shocks are revealed and the entry and exit are determined, is 
the sum of the net worth of surviving banks and the start-up funds 
374 SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
of newly entering bankers. I assume that the new bankers receive a 
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D. International Relative Prices and Balance of Payments
By the law of one price,
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where *2,tP  and 
*
1,tP  are the Foreign final good price of the Foreign and 
Home intermediate goods, respectively. Then, the real exchange rate is 









= =  (29)
The real exchange rate is not generally constant in the presence of bias 
in the final good production; thus, the purchasing power parity does not 
hold in this model. The terms of trade are defined as the relative price 




























, ,1/ToT t ToT tP P
∗=  because of the law of one price. Net exports are 




1, 1, 2, 2,t t t t tNX P Y P Y= −  and 2, 2, 1, 1, ,t t t t tNX P Y P Y
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗= −
for Home and Foreign, respectively. Notably, * 0.t t tNX e NX+ =  Net 
foreign assets in units of the local final good are given by
 1, 2,t t t t t tNFA e Q S Q S
∗ ∗= −  and 2, 1,
1
t t t t t
t
NFA Q S Q S
e
∗ ∗ ∗= −
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for Home and Foreign, respectively, where S2,t is the aggregate holdings 
of the Foreign asset by Home banks. Notably, 0.t t tNFA e NFA
∗+ =
E. Equilibrium and Market Clearing Conditions
An equilibrium of the model is defined as a set of prices and 
allocations, such that all the agents solve their problems, taking the 
prices given and the markets are cleared.
The intermediate good is used locally or exported. Therefore, its global 
resource constraint is given by
 
*
1, 1,t t tY Y Y= +
for the Home intermediate good, where *1,tY  is exported to Foreign; and
 
* *
2, 2,t t tY Y Y= +  
for the Foreign intermediate good, where *2,tY  is sold in Foreign. The 
gross domestic product in units of the final good is given by
 1,t t tGDP P Y=  and 
* * *
2, .t t tGDP P Y=
The market-clearing condition for the final good is
 1
1 tt t t t
t
IF C I G
I −
  





* * * *
*
1
1 tt t t t
t
IF C I G
I −
  
= + + Ψ +     
 (31)
for Foreign. The sum of the Home asset held by Home banks and 
Foreign banks should be equal to the Home asset supplied by the 
i-firms of Home
 1, 2, ,t t tS S S+ =  (32)
and an analogous condition holds for the Foreign asset market, that is,
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* * *
2, 1, .t t tS S S+ =  (33)
The government is assumed to balance its budget and keep its 
expenditure constant as
 t tG G T= =  and 
* *.t tG G T= =
Households in the model have two flow budget constraints, and at least 
one of them should be included in the system of equilibrium equations. 
The profit paid as dividends by banks and the c-firm in the flow budget 
constraint for households are given by
( ) * * *, 1 1, 1 , 1 1, 1 1 1
1
* * *
, 1 1, 1 , 1 1, 1
1 1tt t t t k t t t t k t t t t t
t
k t t t t k t t t
IQ I I R Q S e R Q S R D
I
R Q S e R Q S
π
τ
− − − − − −
−
− − − −
  
 Π = − + Ψ + − + −       





* * * * * * * * *
, 1 2, 1 , 1 2, 1 1 1*
1
* * *




t t t t k t t t k t t t t t
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k t t t k t t t
t
IQ I I R Q S R Q S R D
I e




− − − − − −
−
− − − −
    






III. Solution and Simulation
A. Portfolio Choice
I analyze the dynamics of the model in the neighborhood of the 
deterministic steady state using the first-order accurate approximation. 
Thus, a portfolio choice problem arises when banks choose to lend to 
local and foreign firms. The expected returns on the Home and Foreign 
assets in (24) are identical up to first order; hence, the banks are 
indifferent between the two assets. The total asset supplied, the total 
asset demanded, and net foreign assets are identified, but not their 
decompositions.
I use a method developed by Devereux and Sutherland (2011) to 
compute the zeroth-order component of portfolio allocations, which 
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is needed to calculate the first-order accurate approximation of the 
dynamics of the other variables. The idea is to use the second-order 
accurate approximation of equilibrium conditions, such as (24), 
involving the rates of return of the assets to identify the zeroth-order 
component of the asset holdings.
I write equilibrium conditions in terms of the total asset supplied St 
and *tS , the value of the total asset holdings 
* *
1, 1,t t t t t tM Q S e Q S= +  and 
= +* * *2, 2,(1 ,( )/ )t t t t t tM Q S e Q S  and the excess return on foreign assets 
∗
1,tS  
and S2,t to apply their method. Specifically, the asset market clearing 
conditions (30) and (31) are written as
 ( )1, 2,t t t t t t tQ S Q S S M NFA= + = −
in Home and
 ( )* * * * * * *2, 1,t t t t t t tQ S Q S S M NFA= + = −
in Foreign. The payoffs on the asset holdings in equations, such as (28), 
(34), and (35), are written as
 
* * * * * *
, 1 1, 1 , 1 1, 1 , 1 , , 1 1 1, 1
1
t
k t t t t k t t t k t t k t k t t t t
t
eR Q S e R Q S R M R R e Q S
e− − − − − − − −−
 




* * * * * *1
, 1 2, 1 , 1 2, 1 , 1 , , 1 2, 1
1
1 1t
k t t t k t t t k t t k t k t t t
t t t
eR Q S R Q S R M R R Q S
e e e
−
− − − − − − −
−
 
+ = + − 
 
in Foreign. Those terms involving the excess return on foreign assets 
will disappear in the deterministic steady state and in the first-order 
accurate approximation because of the equality of all the asset returns. 
Thus, the foreign asset holdings will drop out except for their zeroth-
order term.
When solving the model, I modify (24) as
 ( )
* 1
, 1 1 , 1 , 1 1exp 0tt t t t k t k t t
t
eE R R x
e
+
+ + + + +
 
Ξ Ω − − = 
 
to introduce a small stochastic transaction cost xt+1 in foreign asset 
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holdings. The transaction cost is of second order and thus does not 
affect the first-order dynamics of the other variables. The transaction 
cost only affects the portfolio choice problem. Such a transaction 
cost is often used in the open-economy literature to adjust portfolio 
diversification of investors (See Tille and van Wincoop (2010), Devereux 
and Yetman (2010), and Yao (2019)). The literature introduces such a 
transaction cost to reduce excess diversification toward foreign assets 
and match a home bias in portfolio observed in the data. However, 
I introduce the transaction cost to increase diversification toward 
foreign assets. The difference here is that banks want to short foreign 
assets when the transaction is at no cost in the presence of the risk of 
international relative price fluctuations. The result is consistent with 
Heathcote and Perri (2013), who showed that domestic assets are a 
good hedge against nondiversifiable domestic risks when international 
relative prices fluctuate. In their model, portfolio diversification is biased 
toward domestic assets.
Given the benchmark parameter values (which will be explained 
in Section III. C.), I find the returns of domestic and foreign assets in 
units of the domestic final good are negatively correlated with the ef-
fective stochastic discount factor in (24). However, the return of foreign 
assets has a lower negative correlation than the return of domestic 
assets.6 Therefore, banks attempt to borrow from i-firms in a foreign 
country when the transaction is at no cost. I induce the banks to lend 
to a foreign country by introducing the transaction cost because a key 
assumption of the model is that the banks can borrow only from local 
households. Following Heathcote and Perri (2013), I set the size of the 
transaction cost, such that the banks hold 25% of their portfolio in for-
eign assets.
B. Solution Method
I solve for the steady state of the model and linearize the equilibrium 
equations around the steady state. Then, I solve the resulting system of 
6 The model has two types of shock, namely, productivity and capital quality 
shocks. I do not use the capital quality shock in simulating the model and 
computing the correlations because the capital quality shock starts a sudden 
collapse of asset prices. The correlations of the returns of the assets may vary 
when different shocks are assumed in the model.
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equations using the linear rational expectations model solution method 
by Sims (2002).
When the asset markets are incomplete, certain variables of an open-
economy model, such as wealth distribution, become nonstationary. 
Applying a device to make the model stationary is common in the 
literature. For example, Devereux and Yetman (2010) and Yao (2019) 
introduced an endogenous discount factor, and Heathcote and Perri 
(2002) assumed small convex adjustment costs for portfolio holdings. 
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) presented several methods to induce 
stationarity of a small open-economy model and compared their 
resulting dynamics. However, the first-order accurate approximation 
to the equilibrium conditions around the steady state is arbitrarily 
accurate with a sufficiently small perturbation around the steady state 
despite its nonstationarity, as pointed out by Kim, Kim, Schaumburg, 
and Sims (2008). Thus, I do not try to “close” the model or make 
the model stationary. A first-order accurate approximation does not 
converge to the steady state around which the original system is 
approximated, or it does not have the saddle path stability. However, 
the approximate system stays in the neighborhood of the steady state 
when shocks are sufficiently small.
Stationarity is a long-run property, and making a model stationary 
in the long run does not require significant changes in the short- 
and medium-run dynamics of the model. Moreover, closing a model 
affects the dynamics of the model significantly which is undesirable. 
This finding suggests that closing a model is of no practical benefit. Of 
course, in the long run, an unclosed model will diverge with probability 
one. Thus, simulations of finite samples should be used instead of 
simulations of extremely long samples to calculate the moments of 
variables. Simulating samples of the same size as the data is also a 
common practice.
C. Parameter Values
In this section, I explain the parameter values that I use in the 
following simulation exercise. I identify Home with the U.S. and Foreign 
with the rest of the world.7 The frequency of the model is set to a 
7 The rest of the world is a fictional country that includes 15 major European 
countries, Canada, and Japan.
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quarter.
Table 1 summarizes the benchmark parameter values. I assign values 
that are conventional in the literature for preference and technology 
parameters. These parameters and their respective values include the 
following: discount factor β = 0.99, coefficient of risk aversion γ = 2, 
habit formation parameter h = 0.5, relative utility weight of labor χ 
= 0.25, inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply ϵ = 0.5, capital 
share in the intermediate good production α = 0.33, and quarterly 
depreciation rate δ = 0.025. The inverse of the elasticity of investment 
with respect to the price of capital κ ≡ Ψ″( ∙ ) is set to 1.5, which is the 
same as the value used by Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010). By contrast, 
such a value is slightly less than the estimate of 2.5 by Christiano, 
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and the estimate of 2.85 by Justiniano, 
Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010). If the κ is small, then the persistence 
of investment induced by the investment adjustment cost is also small. 
The model includes financial frictions as an additional mechanism to 
generate the investment persistence, unlike the models estimated by 
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Justiniano, Primiceri, 
and Tambalotti (2010). Thus, I choose a smaller value for κ.
The share of imported goods in final good production 1 − w is 
assumed to be 0.15 based on the fact that the volume of imports of 
the U.S. is approximately 15% of its output. The value implies that 
a Home bias is observed in consumption and investment. Following 
Heathcote and Perri (2002), I set the elasticity of substitution between 
the intermediate goods η to 0.9.
I follow Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) for the parameters related to 
financial intermediation. The quarterly survival rate of bankers π is set 
to 0.975, which implies that the average survival period is 10 years. 
The transfer parameter for newly entering bankers τ is set to 0.001, and 
the fraction of assets that a banker can divert θ is set to 0.4. Gertler 
and Kiyotaki (2010) selected τ and π to match an average annual credit 
spread of 100 basis points. One hundred is the approximate average of 
the spreads between mortgage rates and government bonds rates, BAA 
corporate bonds rates and government bonds, and commercial paper 
rates and Treasury Bill rates before 2007. With these values of the 
parameters, the model implies a leverage ratio of 4.39.
For the productivity shock process, I assume that productivity 
shocks exhibit high persistence but have no spillovers across countries. 
Specifically, the productivity shock process is as follows














      
= +      
      
 (36)
where 2( , ) i.i.d (0, )t tu u N I
∗ ′

. I attempt to describe the properties of 
the model regarding the transmission and amplification of productivity 
shocks rather than to use the model to match the business cycle 
moments. Thus, I simply choose a unit standard deviation for the 
shocks and assume that the innovations to the productivity shocks are 
not correlated across countries. For the capital quality shock process, I 
assume that ψt and *tψ  are i.i.d.
IV. Results
In this section, I report and compare the impulse response functions 
of the model with financial frictions due to the borrowing constraint 
and the model without such financial frictions.8 I investigate the effects 
of a negative shock to the productivity and the capital quality using the 
benchmark parameter values.
A. Shocks to Productivity
Figures 1-3 show the impulse response functions to a 1% negative 
shock to the productivity in Foreign. First, I analyze the impulse 
response functions of the model without financial frictions and discuss 
the co-movement of impulse responses across countries particularly. 
Then, I explain the impulse response functions of the model with 
financial frictions and show that financial intermediation amplifies the 
effects of shocks to the productivity domestically and internationally in 
the presence of financial frictions.
a) Model without Financial Frictions
When a negative shock to the productivity hits, the economy of 
Foreign falls into a recession. Output and investment drop on impact 
and fall further for one to two years. Habit formation in consumption 
and the investment adjustment cost induce a hump-shaped response 
for output, consumption, and investment. Consumption decreases 
8 The model without financial frictions does not have the incentive constraint 
(16); therefore, λt = μt = 0. The aggregate demand equation (27) also declines.
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modestly on impact due to habit formation and keeps falling for a 
period of time. Employment picks up slightly on impact due to wealth 
effect, but it declines subsequently as substitution effects dominate.
The shock is transmitted to Home and causes a recession in Home. 
Thus, investment in Home declines. Consumption and employment in-
crease on impact but decrease in subsequent periods. An important chan-
nel for the negative effect on the Home economy is adjustment through 
the fluctuations of international relative prices. The Home intermediate 
goods are now more abundant than the Foreign intermediate goods; thus, 
the relative price of the Home intermediate goods declines. Therefore, the 
terms of trade in Figure 3 go up. This phenomenon leads to substitu-
tion between the Home and Foreign intermediate goods in the final good 
production in Home, but the substitution is not perfect. In addition, the 
production of Foreign intermediate goods is reduced due to the shock. 
Therefore, the production of final goods in Home falls. Given the decline 
in the final good production, investment falls considerably because con-
sumption is not adjusted remarkably due to habit. A fall in investment 
causes the asset price in Home in the current period and in the future to 
drop because of the investment adjustment cost; consequently, invest-
ment further decreases.9 Consumption ends up increasing slightly on 
impact because of the amplified fall in investment. The investment will 
increase on impact without habit formation and investment adjustment 
costs (Heathcote and Perri 2002).
Employment increases on impact despite a fall in actual wage be-
cause wealth effects dominate substitution effects. However, substitu-
tion effects dominate wealth effects in subsequent periods, and employ-
ment declines. Output declines in Home in response to the shock to the 
productivity in Foreign.
I allow the productivity shocks in both countries to fluctuate following 
(36), simulate the model, and estimate the cross-country correlations of 
9 This feedback effect is observed in the following log-linearized optimality 
condition for the c-firm:
   
1
0
ˆ ˆ ,1 jt t t t j
j






where t̂i  and ˆ tq  are the log deviation from the steady state of investment and 
the asset price in Home, respectively.
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variables. The objective is to quantitatively measure the business cycle 
co-movement in response to shocks to productivity and compare it with 
the findings of the literature. Table 2 shows the result.10 Indeed, shocks 
to productivity generate positive co-movement for output, consumption, 
investment, and employment in the model. The cross-country correla-
tion of output is 0.45, which is still smaller than that of consumption 
(0.52) as opposed to what is observed in the data. However, the level is 
considerably higher than what is found in the literature. For example, 
Heathcote and Perri (2002) found that the cross-country correlation of 
output in their model was 0.17–0.24. Moreover, the difference between 
the cross-country correlations of consumption and output is 0.47–0.61, 
depending on the international asset market structure.
The literature has documented that generating positive co-move-
ment of investment and employment across countries is difficult for a 
two-country model (See Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992)). The econ-
omy with relatively high productivity tends to invest more and produce 
more because of the efficient allocation of resources. Baxter and Crucini 
(1995) and Kollmann (1996) restricted the menu of assets that could be 
traded across countries. However, they were successful in generating 
international co-movements only if productivity shocks were persistent 
and therefore insurance for country-specific risks matters. Heathcote 
and Perri (2002) constructed a two-country model with country-specific 
goods that allows for time-varying terms of trade. However, they con-
cluded that the model could not account for positive co-movement of in-
vestment and employment unless the international asset trade is com-
pletely shut down. In this model, the fluctuations of the terms of trade 
in combination with habit formation in consumption and investment 
adjustment costs can generate positive co-movement of investment and 
employment.
b) Model with Financial Frictions
Financial frictions imposed on the benchmark model through 
financial intermediation amplify the effects of productivity shocks 
domestically and internationally. A recession is deeper in Foreign and 
10 I simulate the model only using productivity shocks. Therefore, the 
empirical cross-country correlations reported in Table 2 are not intended for 
direct comparison. I report them only to provide an insight about the empirical 
cross-country correlations observed in the data.
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Home compared with the model with no financial frictions. In both 
countries, output, consumption, investment, and employment decline 
more in the model with financial frictions than that without financial 
frictions.
The mechanism of amplification is the balance sheet channel through 
which the endogenous fluctuations of the asset prices propagate and 
amplify the effects of shocks (Kiyotaki and Moore 1997; Bernanke, 
Gertler, and Gilchrist 1999; Gertler and Kiyotaki 2010). When a negative 
shock to the productivity in Foreign exists, the asset prices of Foreign 
drop. This event also tightens the borrowing constraint of banks in 
Home because the banks in Home are lending to i-firms in Foreign. 
Figure 2 shows the Lagrange multiplier for the borrowing constraint 
jumps. An increase in the credit spread between the risk-free rate and 
the return on the assets in Figure 2 is the result of the more tightly 
binding borrowing constraint. The worsened balance sheet condition 
of the banks in Home forces the banks to reduce their lending to the 
i-firms in Home. Additional effects are observed on the demand for the 
Home asset by the deteriorated balance sheet condition of banks in 
Foreign. Consequently, the demand for Home asset contracts and its 
price drops. This event further tightens the borrowing constraint of the 
banks in Home and Foreign and adds to the effects of the falling prices 
in Foreign. The asset prices further fall in both countries.
In summary, financial intermediation, which faces a borrowing 
constraint, deepens the response of the world economy to country-
specific productivity shocks. Moreover, such financial intermediation 
increases the business cycle co-movement between the two countries. 
Table 2 shows that the cross-country correlations of output, 
consumption, investment, and employment in the model with financial 
frictions increase compared with those without financial frictions.
B. Shocks to Capital Quality
I present the impulse response functions to a 1% negative shock to 
the capital quality in Foreign in Figures 4–6. The basic mechanism 
of propagation of the shock is similar to that of a negative shock to 
productivity. Thus, I present and discuss the results of the model with 
and without financial frictions together.
The world economy responds to a negative shock to the capital 
quality in Foreign similarly to a negative shock to the productivity in 
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Foreign. The shock induces a recession in Foreign and has negative 
effects on the Home economy. Financial frictions amplify the effects of 
the shock domestically and internationally, and the recession caused 
by the shock is deeper in Foreign and Home. The terms of trade and 
the real exchange rate rise because Foreign intermediate goods are less 
abundant than Home intermediate goods.
The most notable difference in the impulse response functions to a 
negative shock to productivity and capital quality is that the latter generates 
larger and more persistent responses of the Home economy. Particularly, 
investment in Home falls below investment in Foreign, and it recovers 
slowly. The reason for the difference is that the marginal product of capital 
jumps in Foreign because part of the capital stock is lost. Therefore, 
the banks in Home and Foreign attempt to lend more to the i-firms in 
Foreign to exploit the higher payoff to their capital. The adjustment goes 
on until the return on capital becomes equal across countries. Then, 
the demand for the Foreign asset is higher than that for the Home 
asset, and investment in Foreign is also higher than that in Home.
Net foreign assets of Home are negative on impact despite the outflow 
of capital because certain Foreign asset holdings of the Home banks 
are lost due to the shock. Net exports of Home are positive because an 
investment in Foreign is higher than investment in Home.
Financial frictions amplify the effects of shocks to capital quality 
due to the borrowing constraint in response to a negative shock to 
productivity. Moreover, financial frictions deepen the recession through 
the balance sheet channel of the banks in Home and Foreign.
C. Sensitivity Analysis
This section reports sensitivity analysis results in terms of the degree 
of habit formation in consumption and the elasticity of investment 
adjustment cost with respect to the capital price. Table 2 shows the 
results. When I drop habit formation in consumption by setting h = 0, 
the model fit for the cross-country correlation of investment deteriorates. 
By contrast, the model fit improves marginally in terms of the cross-
country correlations of output, consumption, and employment. This 
result is the case in the model with and without financial frictions. 
When I assume a strong habit formation in consumption by setting 
h = 0.95, the model generates cross-country correlations that are 
stronger than those in the data, as expected. A more elastic investment 
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adjustment cost with κ = 2.5 helps the model fit the cross-country 
correlation of investment at the expense of generating excessively strong 
cross-country correlations, specifically in consumption. The sensitivity 
result shows that an adjustment cost helps explain the international 
business cycle to introduce financial frictions in the model with habit 
formation in consumption and investment adjustment costs.
V. Conclusion
This study presented a two-good, two-country model in which banks 
facing a borrowing constraint intermediate funds between households 
and firms. First, I showed that the endogenous fluctuations of 
international relative prices increase the business cycle co-movement 
across countries when combined with habit formation in consumption 
and investment adjustment costs. Then, I showed that financial 
frictions due to the borrowing constraint of the banks further amplify 
the effects of productivity and capital quality shocks within a country 
and across countries. The model serves as a framework for the study of 
international monetary policy coordination in a global financial crisis, 




β 0.99 Discount factor
γ 2 Coefficient of risk aversion
h 0.5 Habit formation parameter
χ 0.25 Relative utility weight of labor
ϵ 0.5 Inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply
α 0.33 Capital share
δ 0.025 Depreciation rate
κ 1.5 Inverse elasticity of investment with respect to the 
price of capital
1 − φ 0.85 Share of imported goods in final good production
η 0.9 Elasticity of substitution between traded goods
/G Y 0.2 Share of government expenditures
θ 0.4 Fraction of total assets which can be diverted
τ 0.001 Parameter of transfer to newly entering bankers
π 0.975 Period-to-period survival rate of bankers
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Table 2
cross-country correlations
Output Consumption Investment Employment
Data 0.50 0.36 0.40 0.51
Model without financial frictions
Benchmark 0.45 0.52 0.22 0.49
No habit (h = 0) 0.46 0.51 0.12 0.46
Strong habit (h = 0.95) 0.56 0.62 0.46 0.70
Less elastic investment 
adjustment cost (κ = 0.5)
0.41 0.48 0.09 0.43
More elastic investment 
adjustment cost (κ = 2.5)
0.47 0.54 0.30 0.54
Model with financial frictions
Benchmark 0.53 0.58 0.35 0.58
No habit (h = 0) 0.52 0.53 0.29 0.52
Strong habit (h = 0.95) 0.70 0.73 0.61 0.77
Less elastic investment 
adjustment cost (κ = 0.5)
0.46 0.52 0.16 0.47
More elastic investment 
adjustment cost (κ = 2.5)
0.57 0.61 0.44 0.63
Notes:  The cross-country correlations of the models are sample means of 10,000 
simulations using only productivity shocks. The empirical cross-country 
correlations are not intended for direct comparison with the model cross-country 
correlations. The data for output, consumption, and investment are taken from 
OECD Quarterly National Accounts (OECD-QNA), and they are gross domestic 
product, private consumption expenditure, and gross fixed capital formation, 
respectively. The data span the period from 1972:1 to 2006:4. For the rest of 
the world, I use an aggregate of Canada, Japan, and 15 European countries, 
including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom. I construct the data of Japan prior to 1980 using the growth rates of 
each variable in the dataset compiled by Heathcote and Perri (2002) because the 
OECD-QNA provides the data only after 1980 for Japan. The data for output, 
consumption, and investment are a volume whose base year is 2000, and I 
convert them to the constant 2000 U.S. dollar prices. I use PPP exchange rates in 
2000, calculated using a consumer price index, to aggregate the data of the non-
US countries. The series for employment is the civilian employment index taken 
from OECD Main Economic Indicators. For the rest of the world, the employment 
series is an aggregate of employment in Canada, Japan, Austria, Finland, 
Germany, Italy, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, whose employment series is 
available for all the sample periods.













































































































































































































































































































































































































390 SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Notes:  The size of the shock is 1%. The scale of the impulse response is the 
percentage deviation from the steady state for the real exchange rate and 
the terms of trade. The scale of the impulse response of net exports and net 
foreign assets is 100 times the ratio of net exports and net foreign assets to 
the steady-state output.
Figure 3 
imPulse resPonse Functions to a shock to the ProductiVity in Foreign (3)
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